Introduction
P ERVASIVE COMPUTING TECHNOLO-GIES have become a new paradigm for the next decades to come. Thinking about pervasive computing means asking fundamental questions about how we interact in societies with artificial systems and how that will influence our lives. Because pervasive computing is an enabling technology for many different applications and services, its discussion is often tied to those specific applications. However, in our view it is possible to investigate some general principles of pervasive computing without compromising the differences on the level of application.
In this paper we argue that the specific properties of pervasive computing require new and different answers of how a society should deal with it. Compared to other technologies, for example nuclear power plants or genetic engineered food, pervasive computing describes not only more or less invisible processes but it is also not restricted to specific areas of a social life or societies. Its applications can be found in any area, whether this is industry or within the private realm. However, together with other technologies pervasive computing shares the fundamental problem that innovations and their implementations are coming first, whereas the analysis of societal perceptions in terms of risks and benefits comes second (Beck et al. 1994; Beck 2006) . The public discussion of genetically modified food is one example for this development.
The research question we ask in this paper is how risk governance of pervasive computing should be designed. We are suggesting the application of an integrated risk governance framework as proposed by the International Risk Governance Council (IR-GC) (International Risk Governance Council 2005) , that approach will be presented in the next section. As part of an ongoing research project 1 we specifically apply in this paper empirical data collected in semi-structured interviews as well as the results of desktop research to one specific phase of the proposed risk governance framework, the phase of technical risk assessment and social concern assessment. This work is seen as a first and fundamental step of applying the data at hand to the integrated risk governance framework as a whole.
After discussing the integrated risk governance framework according to the IRGC we will discuss the basic principles of pervasive computing and present findings from studies about the technical risk assessment. The subsequent part is devoted to display the empirical results from qualitative interviews conducted in the research project. The information gained in those two chapters are going to be combined, thereby answering fundamental questions the risk governance framework raises. In the last part we will summarize our findings.
Integrated Risk Governance Framework
Risk management and risk communication strategies have to incorporate different approaches on risk and provide solutions that are in line with the technical risk estimates but also compatible with public concerns and cultural beliefs. Thereby risk managers are confronted with a fundamental problem in managing of and communicating on risks: neither technical expertise nor public perceptions of risks alone can serve as a decision making basis. Technical expertise on risks is a necessary condition to make prudent decisions on risks. Due to uncertainty in extrapolating past experiences to the future and the legitimate role of public concerns in democratic societies, reliance on technical expertise is, however, not sufficient. In turn, public perceptions of risks, although they still have to be regarded as a valid expression of public preferences, are a product of a number of biases and cognitive shortcuts, which make it neither possible to infer stable decisions not wise to base political decisions on them. Furthermore, neither scientists nor the public are coherent groups, rather in both areas views and arguments will be contested by others. Hence, how can a pluralistic society initiate a decision-making process that will serve all interests?
The International Risk Governance Council (International Risk Governance Council 2005) is currently developing a framework for risk governance to help analyse how society could better address and respond to such risks. To this end, the IRGC's framework maps out a structured approach, which guides its user through the process of investigating global risk issues and designing appropriate governance strategies. This approach combines scientific evidence with economic considerations as well as social concerns and societal values and thus ensures that any risk-related decision draws on the broadest possible view of risk. The approach also states the case for an effective engagement of all relevant stakeholders (International Risk Governance Council 2005) . Thus, the inclusion of the societal context is a major innovation of IRGC's proposed framework. The societal context comprises, besides concerns of individuals and stakeholders, benefits to the society at large, socio-economic impacts and regulatory policies. Further, the interplay of different actors regarding the risk issue is also an integral part of the framework.
In addition to the inclusion of the societal context, the second major innovation of IRGC's risk governance framework is the categorisation of risk-related knowledge (International Risk Governance Council 2005) . One of the main difficulties in assessing risks is the establishment of a cause-effect-relationship between the risk agent and its potential consequences for the targeted object. The degree of difficulty of establishing this link, the reliability of this link as well as the degree of controversy regarding the judgement of acceptability of the risk is categorized within IRGC's framework as linear, complex, uncertain or ambiguous. Complexity refers thereby to the difficulty of establishing a cause-effect chain, uncertainty refers additionally to e.g. random errors in modelling, and ambiguity describes the situation where either identical assessment results are interpreted differently (interpretive ambiguity) or where different concepts of what can be regarded as tolerable are applied (normative ambiguity, e.g. referring to ethics or life-style). According to this categorization, different management routes, stakeholder involvement and risk assessment procedures are proposed.
The core risk governance process is shown in the following figure. The basic assumptions for the following process of risk appraisal have to be agreed upon in the pre-assessment phase. The problem framing constitutes the first element of pre-assessment, i.e. systematically collecting and processing different perspectives of how to conceptualize the issue. Within the pre-assessment phase, a second component refers to the scientific conventions for the screening and assessment. The second phase, the risk appraisal phase, contains two central points of the IRGC Framework: the technical risk assessment and the social concern assessment. The technical risk assessment uses commonly applied techniques of quantifying and assessing risks. Beginning with hazard identification and estimation, the potential for adverse effects is recognized and the strength of cause-effect relationships is assessed. Combined with an exposure and vulnerability assessment -different risk targets show different vulnerabilities dependent e.g. on their exposure -a technical risk estimation is derived. Social concern assessment is using methods from social sciences to assess risk perceptions, social concerns as well as socio-economic impacts of the risk. The importance to assess perceived risks is underlined because human behaviour is dependent on perception, not on facts as for example stemming from technical risk assessment. Humans tend to use qualitative risk characteristics to evaluate risks, such as the perceived dreadfulness of a risk, whether one is familiar with the risk, whether one can exert personal control over the risk (such as in sports), whether the risk is taken voluntarily, and also whether one trusts risk regulating institutions. These qualitative risk characteristics can be structured into semantic risk patterns to reduce complexity: risk as an immediate threat (e.g. large dams), risk as a blow of fate (natural disasters), risk as a challenge to one's own strength (sports), risk as a gamble (lottery), and risk as an early indication of an insidious danger (viruses, food additives) (Renn 1990; Renn/Levine 1991; Renn 1997 , Renn 2004 Renn / Rohrmann 2000) . Risk perception studies show that often a stigmatization of risks takes place, e.g. the label 'carciogenic' leads to the immediate rejection of a product (Renn / Rohrmann 2000) .
Within the third phase, the tolerability and acceptability judgement phase, the risk is being characterised and evaluated according to the standards agreed upon earlier in the pre-assessment phase and by using the output of the risk appraisal phase. This phase might be the most controversial, as finally a decision has to be made about how to further proceed with the risk.
The fourth phase, the risk management phase, deals with decision making about risk reduction options if deemed necessary and their implementation. According to the state of knowledge about the risk (i.e. linear, complex, uncertain, or ambiguous), a different management route is proposed, with the distinction whether the focus is on the target (risk absorbing system) or the risk agent itself. Depending on the state of knowledge about the risk, different conflicts have to be faced, and in turn different forms of public participation and stakeholder involvement become necessary. Thus, stakeholder involvement is not only advisable for normative reasons, but for functional reasons as well. Often stakeholder involvement is a prerequisite for public acceptance but also for collecting relevant evidence and identifying evaluative criteria. It provides decision makers and risk assessors with relevant knowledge, whether that is systematic, experiential, or anecdotal.
The following table summarizes the management strategies appropriate for the specific knowledge characterisation, appropriate management instru-ments and the form of stakeholder participation being advisable. In this paper we will focus in the following chapters on the risk appraisal phase, which contains the technical risk assessment and the social concern assessment. The next section addresses issues of technical risk assessment, relying on a literature review.
Figure 2: Risk Characteristics and their Implications for Risk Management (International Risk Governance

Pervasive Computing: Properties and Impacts
Mark Weiser can be seen as the pioneer thinker in the pervasive computing area. The term pervasive computing is largely used as a more pragmatic approach by industry, whereas Weiser originally used the term 'ubiquitous computing' and some European researchers additionally label this technology as 'ambient intelligence' (Langheinrich/Mattern 2003: 7) . Keeping in mind Moores' law, which states that every 18 months the processor power of a computer doubles at the same price (Moore 1965 ), Weiser assumed that the personal computer as we know it today will diminish. Instead, everywhere-computing will arise and in fact be of far greater use for society as the complex personal computer ever has been (Weiser 1991) . This development is supported by findings in materials sciences, nanotechnology, and microsystems technologies, which build the basis for applications of invisible computers on car windshields, eyeglass lenses, smart papers etc.
The new dimension introduced by pervasive computing in contrast to common information technologies can be exemplified with looking at who communicates with what or whom. In the 1980s human actors began to use email technology to communicate with other human actors, i.e. a human-human communication. The following decade of the 90s introduced a new mode of interaction with human actors interacting with remote machines, which is basically the use of the World Wide Web. The new interactional dimension introduced by pervasive computing now is the communication of machines with machines without direct human interference or even recognition.
2 This newly introduced dimension of interaction has impacts on many different aspects of society, foremost on the question of responsibility and accountability of communication and interaction. If machines interact with each other, who is accountable for malfunctions? We will turn to this question later on, first some central characteristics of pervasive computing are described here.
Pervasive computing applications can be characterized with ubiquity, miniaturisation, embeddedness, interconnectedness, and context sensitivity. Ubiquity is also often labelled as anytime -anywhere computing. This term describes the fundamental idea of Mark Weiser described above, which is the invisibility of the computer and its use regardless of location. Due to increasing progress in the energy supply of pervasive computing applications, the anywhereanytime computing has left the status of visionary thinking. Those devices without own energy supply use the energy of the surrounding context as own energy source, for example through materials, which produce energy from changes in the temperature (Langheinrich/Mattern 2003: 8) . Ubiquity becomes also possible through the miniaturisation of pervasive computing devices. Sensors and radio chips are already produced having the size of a finger nail, which fosters the embeddedness of those chips in other devices. Sensor chips are implemented into clothes (so-called wearables) and other products of daily supply. However, these chips themselves are rather stupid: they basically deliver information and receive information. Building smart agents out of rather stupid sensors becomes possible through the interconnectedness and the context sensitivity of those sensors. Because they can communicate and interact with each other, those sensors are able to build a network, which in turn entails the processing of much more information than a single device could handle. The information load may also be dependent on the context of a sensor (e.g. temperature).
These characteristics become more obvious looking at specific examples of pervasive computing applications. One of the most prominent examples is the application of smart chips for industrial logistics. Single products as well as whole pallets and even containers could be provided with RFID-chips.
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RFID-chips can in the simplest way function as a better barcode, however their readability-range is far greater. The use of these technologies enables the surveillance of the whole product delivery chain, starting from the production halls via air or ship transport until the supermarket is reached. For large companies, but as well as for insurances covering the loss of the product within the transport chain, the application of this technology means a huge potential for saving money. This technology is already applied within many companies (Langheinrich/Mattern 2003: 9) . Further, having the products delivered to the supermarket and being read without human intervention within the supermarket's inventory list, products will automatically be re-ordered from the supermarket's system if close to being out of stock -again without human intervention.
Logistical issues may have indirect effects on the consumer, however probably will not play a major role in consumers' perception. This is different with insurance rates calculated with a 'pay-per-risk' scheme. Information on who is driving a specific car, when it's driven and where and whether the driver tends to be speeding will be transmitted to a remote system. According to this data the individual insurance premium is calculated. This model is already applied in Austria, United Kingdom and the US, in Germany some pilot trials are currently running.
Within the aircraft industry, the application of hybrid pervasive computing systems partially is already implemented and applied. A prominent example is the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), which is used in many aircrafts from a certain size upon. If two planes are recognized to be on collision course, TCAS first issues traffic advisory warnings to both pilots of the two planes. Further, if no action is taken TCAS increases the warning level and issues resolution advisory, which is a specific action recommended contrary to the action suggested in the second plane ("sink" and "climb" command). Thus, two hybrid agents (hybrid because TCAS relies in the end on human action) communicate in a network to solve the highly dangerous situation of planes on a collision course.
TCAS, however, points also to one of the basic problematic aspects of pervasive computing systems that is the question of agency. Weyer investigated the mid-air collision of two planes at Ueberlingen (Germany) in 2002 (Weyer 2006) , and found out this collision to be largely a result of different emergency procedures of the two plane crews. Whereas Russian flight crews are advised to obey orders from the ground control in the first place, European and American standard procedures (which the second plane, a DHL cargo aircraft, ascribed to) set TCAS over the ground control orders. 4 The ground control in the described emergency situation now gave orders contrary to TCAS' orders, having the Russian crew obeying them, however not the crew of the DHLplane, and the planes inevitably collided (Weyer 2006) . This case highlights dramatically the unsolved question of agency within hybrid systems: are humans in charge of the final decisions or technical agents? Who will be accountable in either case? In principle, the same questions apply for the car industry, transferring responsibility and accountability from human drivers to technical agents, however legal liability cannot be ascribed to technical agents.
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As discussed above, one distinct feature of pervasive computing systems is their character of building large networks. In the years to come, a whole infrastructure of pervasive computing systems could be build on those networks (Langheinrich/Mattern 2003: 12) . However, if every-day applications are dependent on a bigger infrastructure instead of being independent events, the vulnerability of the system as a whole increases. Thinking about networks of electricity supply and their vulnerability to single events, the problematic of pervasive computing infrastructures becomes even more obvious, as their failure (e.g. due to terrorism, natural catastrophes etc.) will have impacts not only on one, but in fact on many areas (Langheinrich/Mattern 2003: 12) .
Pervasive computing applications do also trigger fears in the public, e.g. referring to privacy issues. We will discuss these aspects below. The focus of the current chapter is, besides the description of the technology as such and some application areas, in investigating the technical problems associated. The problems mentioned in the above examples point from the view of technical risk assessment, as described in the risk governance framework, to two main dimensions: complexity and uncertainty. Pervasive computing systems working in smaller networks, but even more so in large infrastructures, are characterized by the complexity of their cause and effect chain. Single events can trigger unintended responses in locally and logically distant systems. Intervening variables, as for example different programming languages in different technology cultures, contribute to this complexity. Unresolved complexity often leads to a considerable degree of uncertainty (International Risk Governance Council 2005) , as for example different vulnerability levels of individual targets or inferential errors. Further, the ongoing context awareness of smart agents impedes the possibility to forecast their behaviour. One can conclude from the side of technical risk assessment, that pervasive computing infrastructures are shaped by complexity and uncertainty, a result also supported by further studies undertaken in this field (Hilty et al. 2003; Mattern 2003; Som et al. 2004; Weyer 2006) .
Going back to the structuring of knowledge within the IRGC risk governance framework (International Risk Governance Council 2005) , besides complexity and uncertainty ambiguity is discussed as a main dimension. In the next chapter, the empirical data collected in the research project ORINOCO will be presented. The analysis of this empirical data is intended to shed light on whether pervasive computing technologies can be, besides being characterised as complex and uncertain, also be characterised as ambiguous in terms of risk perceptions.
Pervasive Computing: Empirical Analysis of Concerns
Public perceptions of risks often differ from professional assessments, as laid out in the discussion in the first part of this paper. However, even experts do not always agree on what can be regarded as a risk and what threat a risk specifically poses. Within the research project ORINOCO, stakeholder and expert interviews 6 with actors from the media, NGOs, science and from regulating institutions have been conducted. These interviews focused mainly on risk perceptions and perceived opportunities towards pervasive computing applications, possibilities for risk governance as seen by the interviewees, and comments on privacy issues and the German legal framework.
The distinction between expert and lay is often blurry. Although many actors have an expert knowledge, as for example experts of consumer protection associations or from some media, they are also stakeholders and often use qualitative risk characteristics to evaluate risks of pervasive computing.
The risks that were identified and articulated during the interviews can be structured in four categories:
(a) Loss of agency: Interviewed actors fear a loss of individual agency (control) because pervasive computing applications are perceived as a concealed technology without direct user access. Several subdimensions belong to this category:
Technology paternalism. This sub-dimension describes the fear that technologies are not only telling the user what to do but rather they do it without the user having a chance of interfering. Examples are driver assistance systems in cars.
Property. Control over self-owned goods decreases in two respects. Firstly, smart consumer goods or services may control the owner's behaviour (e.g. in cases of littering or driving behaviour). Secondly, the increase of pay-peruse products leaves the ownership to the service provider, i.e. the consumer holds only limited user-rights.
Misuse and sabotage. The interviewed persons emphasize their fear that misuse and sabotage of pervasive computing applications will happen at some point in the future. However, users fear a lack of responsiveness to handle and control misuse because of the hidden and concealed character of these applications.
(b) Privacy and informational self-determination. The interview partners emphasized the individual right of privacy including the choice to grant and withdraw the right to other actors for collecting and processing personal data. Risks are seen in the unobtrusive collection of personal data as well as in the combination of collected data from different contexts that would enable organizations to reconstruct complex and comprehensive user-profiles for different purposes. Special emphasis is placed on possible interest by public parties to gain access to sensible data (e. g. for crime fighting or safety considerations). Furthermore, the traceability of individuals mattered: Interviewees feared the creation of movement profiles as well as of risk profiles, e.g. unhealthy products like tobacco could communicate with the computer of the health insurance company after being purchased.
(c) Complexity. If pervasive computing applications are applied at a large scale, the interview partners were concerned with the manageability of these interacting systems. Sabotage and simple dysfunctions could result in severe infrastructural disruptions.
(d) Abolishment of insurances' solidarity principle. If insurance premiums are calculated on the basis of genetic traits or inert individual risk, some services will become unaffordable for some groups. Whether these (mis)uses of sensitive data for health insurance can be triggered by smart devices in other contexts such as accident prevention systems in cars, is still contested. Yet, there has been major concern that customers of smart devices might unwillingly provide information to others that they can use to harm that specific person.
Other perceived risks mentioned in the interviews and not summarized in the above categories are environmental risks (referring to radiation and recycling of technical devices), and new social hierarchies depending on the ability to use and access these new technologies.
Opportunities of pervasive computing applications are mostly ascribed to increased comfort for the user and more efficient business models for industry. Increased comfort can be found in many applications, basically tailoring services to the specific needs of the individual user. The industry's viewpoint is emphasizing the same issue, using examples such as offering dynamic pricing for goods and services. Logistical questions are also at the core of opportunities mentioned by industry. Further, insurance companies -as one possible application field of pervasive computing technologies -welcome the abolishment of informational asymmetry, i.e. insurances know exactly what risk a specific individual is bearing.
The empirical data from the expert interviews will now brought together with findings of the technical risk assessment discussed above.
Risk Appraisal: Bringing together Risk Assessment and Social Concern Assessment
As shown in the discussion of IRGC's risk governance framework, after the pre-assessment phase the IRGC framework suggests a risk appraisal phase which integrates technical risk assessment and the social concern assessment (International Risk Governance Council 2005: 7). The research conducted so far in this ongoing research project is suitable to answer crucial questions regarding the risk appraisal phase. More specifically, the desktop research shown in the third part of this paper gives references to the technical risk assessment, whereas the empirical data shown in the fourth part enables the discussion of social concern assessment. Bringing the results of both together helps to answer the question of knowledge about a risk, answered in dimensions of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity.
Complexity. Regarding the technical risk assessment, studies as those cited in chapter 3 point out the most prevalent technical risks associated with pervasive computing. Many of those studies refer to unmastered complexity as an issue (Hilty et al. 2003; Hilty et al. 2004; Som et al. 2004; Langheinrich/Mattern 2003; Mattern 2003; Bohn et al. 2004 ; Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) 2006). The cause-effect relationship of pervasive computing networks is not always easy to detect, because a multitude of other smart agents can function as an intervening variable. The vulnerability of decentralized networks increases complexity as well in cases of malfunctioning or deliberate attacks on the network. The question of agency raised in the discussion of TCAS above in chapter 3 refers to complexity as well. Here, it is unclear and hard to detect who is taking responsibility and who is liable for decisions made by a smart agent.
Complexity seen from the angle of social concern assessment points to the issue of a concealed technology, which is intransparent for the users and hardly if at all manageable. Further, social concerns are being raised in terms of possible terrorists' attacks on the networks' infrastructure with unintended secondary impacts through large networks.
Uncertainty. Another distinct characteristic of pervasive computing networks are the context sensitivity and the communication about the context of smart agents to other smart agents. This exchange of information between smart agents is as much unpredictable as the context itself is. Thus, the ongoing context sensitivity and reactions to the context impede forecasting of smart agents' behaviour. Further, it is uncertain how smart agents will behave in cases of malfunction or attack from the outside. This characteristic leads to a high level of uncertainty as conceptualized within the IRGC framework. Results from social concern assessments show that uncertainty is feared for example if smart agents become disloyal (Mattern 2003) .
Ambiguity. Ambiguity can be divided into normative and interpretive ambiguity, the latter describing a situation where identical assessment results are interpreted differently, whereas the former describes different notions about what can be regarded as tolerable referring to individual life-style and other values. Due to users' high dependability on pervasive computing applications, trust evolves as a question of normative ambiguity. If malfunctions cannot be detected by the individual user, s/he has no other option than trusting the technical quality of the device. Furthermore, privacy issues and the right of informational self-determination play a large role in the category of ambiguity: it is the fear of 'bigbrother', in some parts ascribed to industry, however in larger parts to the state. Especially in times of increased sensitivity towards terrorism, actors fear an uncontrolled collection and recombination of sensitive data from different sources that could lead to data pools that provide a comprehensive image of the person in question with all his or her physical and mental abilities and weaknesses.
Conclusions
In this paper we argue that pervasive computing technologies have distinct characteristics in terms of the technical risk assessment and in terms of associated social concerns that need to be dealt with in an integrative risk governance approach. Such an approach is suggested by the International Risk Governance Council. The subsumption of technical risk assessment results and social concerns in an integrated analysis, the categorization of concerns according to complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity and the juxtaposition of promises and fears relating to the various applications of pervasive computing have been the three major structuring tools for this paper describing the state of knowledge about pervasive computing risks. The proposed IRGC's framework proved to be a valuable and fruitful concept to analyse and interpret the results of the empirical analysis of stakeholders risk perceptions and concerns. We argue that because of the complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity associated with pervasive computing risks, the application of a risk governance framework that integrates both the technical risk assessment and the social concern assessment, as done in IRGC's framework, is inevitable. The next step will be the application of the risk tolerability and acceptability phase and the decision on a management route. As with the risk appraisal phase, the following steps can be undertaken on the level of pervasive computing in general or on the level of concrete applications. Both seem to be fruitful and a promising approach to find in the end recommendations of actions to the involved actors and stakeholders. Ongoing research is necessary to analyse risk perceptions of the public in more detail, as it will be done in this research project through focus-groups with citizens. Future work might also differentiate between different applications of pervasive computing technologies and compare possible differences between the related social concerns.
